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 Introduction 
 Regress arguments have had a long and influential history within the philos-
ophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. They are especially commonplace 
as a bulwark against representational or  intentional theories of psychologi-
cal capacities. For instance, arguments of this sort played a prominent role 
in debates concerning the theory of transformational grammar ( Chomsky, 
1969a ; 1969b;  Harman, 1967 ,  1969 ), the language of thought hypothesis 
( Fodor, 1975 ,  1987 ;  Laurence & Margolis, 1997 ), the massive modular-
ity hypothesis ( Fodor, 2000 ;  Collins, 2005 ), and intentional accounts of 
intelligent activity quite broadly ( Ryle, 1949 ;  Fodor, 1968 ;  Dennett, 1978 ). 
Typically, the regress is presented as one horn of a dilemma: 
 To explain the manifestation of some kind of capacity,  C , the theorist 
postulates an (intentional) psychological process of kind  P . But, the critic 
suggests, the successful operation of any  P process itself depends upon 
some prior manifestation of  C . Thus: Either it is necessary to postulate 
a second psychological process of kind  P , and so on,  ad infinitum , or 
alternatively, one must grant that  C can be explained without positing  P . 
 Thus the proposed intentional theory is either broken-backed or redundant. 
Or so proponents of regress arguments would have us believe. 
 Recently, a similar argument—which we simply call the  Regress —has sur-
faced in philosophical debate regarding the nature of reasoning. Participants 
in this debate are not concerned with everything that gets called ‘reason-
ing’. Rather, they focus on a relatively circumscribed range of reasoning-
like phenomena—which they call  active reasoning or  inference — 1 a kind of 
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1 Three comments regarding terminology. First, as is common in the present context (but 
see Broome, 2013, 292), we use ‘active reasoning’ and ‘inference’ interchangeably. Second, 
although it is slightly infelicitous to use ‘inference’ in this restricted sense, it should be read 
as such unless explicitly modifi ed—e.g., as in sub-personal inference. Third, as is typical, we 
take it to be true, more-or-less by defi nition, that a process or activity is active only if it is 
person-level. As such, we count no sub-personal processes as active.
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2 It is worth noting, in this regard, that philosophers writing on inference have tended to focus 
on cases in which we reason in accordance with logical rules, such as modus ponens. Further, 
Boghossian (2008, 499) claims that whereas denying the Rule-Following View of reasoning 
in general seems false, denying the Rule-Following View of deductive reasoning in particular 
seems ‘unintelligible’.
person-level, conscious, voluntary activity, which at least in paradigmatic 
instances results in the fixation of belief. It is widely assumed that active 
reasoning in this sense is fairly pervasive among human beings; that it can 
involve attitudes with markedly differing contents; that simple, consciously 
made, deductive inferences are a prototypical case; and that errors in active 
reasoning are both possible and, indeed, fairly commonplace. For philoso-
phers interested in active reasoning, then, the core explanatory challenge 
is to provide an illuminating account of the nature of this psychological 
capacity. 
 Within this context, the presumed significance of the Regress is that it 
(allegedly) undermines a family of highly influential accounts of inference—
what might be called  intentional rule-following (or IRF) theories. To a first 
approximation, such theories make a pair of commitments. First, they sup-
pose that inference essentially involves following rules concerning the prem-
ises from which one reasons: 
 (Rule-Following View): All active reasoning involves rule-following 
operations. 
 In addition, they impose the following necessary condition on rule-following: 
 (Intentional View): All rule-following involves intentional states, which 
 represent the rules being followed. 
 In brief, the Regress purports to show that if such accounts were correct, 
 any instance of active reasoning—no matter how apparently simple—would 
be a  supertask involving an infinite number of rule-following operations. In 
which case, contrary to fact, it would be impossible for finite creatures such 
as us to actively reason. 
 If the Regress were sound, it would have serious implications for philo-
sophical debate regarding the nature of inference. What may be less obvious 
is that it would also have significant consequences for scientific theories of 
reasoning, and cognition more broadly. Within the psychology of reasoning, 
quite generally, and the psychology of  deductive reasoning in particular, it is 
commonplace to suppose that reasoning relies on mentally represented rules. 2 
This commitment is perhaps most apparent in  mental logic accounts, where it 
is explicitly hypothesized that there are “deduction rules that construct mental 
proofs in the system’s working memory” ( Rips, 1994 , 104). But the commit-
ment is also apparent among dual-process theorists who routinely suppose 
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32 Paul D. Robinson and Richard Samuels
that System 2 processes involve intentional states that represent rules ( e.g., 
Sloman, 1996 ). Moreover, we suspect—though won’t argue here—that even 
those who explicitly reject the mental logic approach  also presuppose the exis-
tence of intentional states that represent rules. For example,  mental models 
accounts seem to presuppose the existence of such states, albeit where the pre-
sumed rules are for the manipulation and inspection of iconic models denoting 
possibilities, as opposed to the construction of mental proofs through chaining 
linguistic entities such as sentences ( e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2008 ). 
 Of course, such accounts of reasoning are contentious and may turn out 
to be false. But on the face of it, this should be an empirical issue, addressed 
by empirical means. If the Regress is sound, however, such theories should 
be rejected a priori. Further, as we will show, since the Regress does not 
turn essentially on assumptions about the nature of  active reasoning per se, 
the argument, if sound, would apply to a far broader class of phenomena. 
Specifically, as we will see, it would apply, with minimal modification, to 
processes that are unconscious and sub-personal, and, hence, not active. If 
sound, then, the Regress would have ramifications for a wide array of theo-
ries in many regions of cognitive science, including theories of perception. 
 Fortunately, the Regress is not sound. Formulations of the argument are 
invariably underspecified, and once presented in suitably perspicuous fashion, it 
becomes clear that the Regress relies on assumptions no sensible version of IRF 
should endorse. The primary burden of this chapter is to show why this is so. 
 Here’s how we proceed. In Section 1, we explain the IRF account of rea-
soning in more detail, and set out some of its  prima facie virtues. In Section 
2, we aim to explain the general structure of the Regress and provide the 
most charitable formulation of the argument that we can. In Section 3, we 
discuss a standard—and we think correct—response to this original regress: 
to posit sub-personal inferential processes. We show that this response 
provides a plausible way to block the original regress. But following sug-
gestions from Boghossian and others, we also a) show how to develop a 
Revenge Regress, which targets IRFs about sub-personal processes, and b) 
explain how to use this result to develop a Strengthened Regress, which fills 
the gap in the original argument. Finally, in Section 4 we explain why the 
Strengthened Regress is still subject to a serious objection, and in Section 5 
we address two responses to this objection. 
 1.  The Virtues of Intentional Rule-Following 
Accounts of Inference 
 The IRF is not so much a single account of inference as a family of proposals 
that share a common commitment to the Rule-Following View of inference 
and to the Intentional View of rule-following. In our view, such proposals 
merit serious consideration because they possess a host of explanatory vir-
tues. We are especially sympathetic to variants of IRF that incorporate some 
form of computationalism about mental processes—a class that includes the 
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sort of ‘classicism’ advocated by  Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988 ), versions of con-
nectionism (e.g., Smolensky, 1988), and some recent Bayesian approaches 
to cognitive modeling ( e.g., Perfors, Tenenbaum, & Regier, 2011 ). These 
frameworks are among the most plausible extant approaches to the study of 
higher cognition in general, and reasoning in particular. 
 Although this is not the place to discuss the virtues of IRFs in detail, a brief 
reminder should make clear that much is at stake if the Regress is sound. First, 
consider some of the prima facie explanatory virtues that accrue merely as 
a result of adopting the Rule-Following View (cf.  Boghossian, 2014 , 4, 12): 
 •  A theory of reasoning should discriminate reasoning from mere causa-
tion by belief (and other intentional states). Not all instances of beliefs 
causing other beliefs are inferences. Notoriously, there are “deviant” 
causal chains involving beliefs that are obviously non-inferential. 3 The 
rule-following account helps to explain the difference. Very roughly, in 
the case of inference, the infl uence of belief is wholly mediated by rule-
following operations and in the other cases, not. 
 •  Since not all reasoning is good reasoning, we should prefer, on grounds 
of generality, an account that covers both the good and the bad. Rule-
following accounts can capture this desideratum. On such views, one 
can reason badly, either by following a bad rule or by making mistakes 
in one’s attempt to follow good rules. In contrast, good reasoning only 
occurs when one correctly follows a good rule. 
 •  A theory of reasoning ought to explain the sorts of generality that are 
exhibited by inference. For example, it is widely recognized by philoso-
phers and psychologists that we are capable of reasoning about an exceed-
ingly broad array of topics—roughly, any topic for which we possess 
concepts. Moreover, our inferences often exhibit similar patterns or ‘logi-
cal forms’ across these various topical domains. Rule-following accounts 
provide promising explanations of such phenomena. Specifi cally, if some 
inferential rules are akin to logical rules in being largely ‘content indepen-
dent’ or ‘formal’, then we have a partial explanation of why we are able to 
reason about so many different subject matters. Further, if we suppose that 
humans follow these rules in lots of different contexts, we will have an 
explanation of why inferences in different domains exhibit similar forms. 
 •  A theory of active reasoning should both subsume and explain the dif-
ference between deductive and inductive reasoning. Once again, the rule-
following picture offers a natural account. When reasoning deductively, 
the relevant rule-following operations involve deductive rules, and when 
one reasons inductively, the relevant rules are inductive ones. 
3 Example: Suppose John believes that he’s late for class and that this realization makes him 
sweat. If on the basis of this experience he came to believe that he was sweating, we could 
have a case of causation by belief, but not inference.
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4 Although it does not require endorsing the Intentional View in its full generality, it is also 
worth noting that the idea that rules are encoded by intentional states helps explain what 
is otherwise a puzzling fact about human beings—namely, we are capable of learning rules 
that infl uence our behavior on the basis of “one-shot” instruction or linguistic communica-
tion. For example, if, at passport control, the guard tells me, “Stand behind the yellow line, 
until you are called”, I stand behind the yellow line and wait to be called! On the basis of 
one exposure to instruction, my behavior is modifi ed so that I follow the rule. This is readily 
explained on the assumption that, on the basis of linguistic processing, I come to possess one 
or more intentional states that represent the content of the guard’s utterance—i.e., the rule.
 No doubt there are other issues that the Rule-Following View might help 
address, but let’s turn to the Intentional View. As we see it, there are two 
deep and closely related explanatory motivations for this view. The first is 
what we call the  Guidance Problem . The aforementioned explanatory vir-
tues of the Rule-Following View all turn on the assumption that rules can 
in some sense  guide our cognitive activities. But how is this possible? After 
all, a rule  qua rule is ‘just an abstract object’ and so presumably incapable 
of exerting any causal influence ( Boghossian, 2014 , 13). 
 Here’s where the Intentional View enters the picture. Although rules as 
such cannot guide cognition, intentional states that encode or represent such 
rules can. For in addition to their representational properties, intentional 
states have other properties that are causally relevant—various physical 
and structural properties, for example. On the Intentional View, then, rules 
guide behavior in an attenuated sense: they are the contents of intentional 
states—rule-representations—that are causally implicated in reasoning. 4 
 A second and related virtue of the Intentional View is that it helps resolve 
a very old problem for rule-following accounts of cognition. In brief, such 
accounts presuppose a distinction between following a rule and mere  accor-
dance with a rule (see  e.g., Hahn & Chater, 1998 , 203f.). Without such a 
distinction, rule-following  per se will be of little use in explaining what is 
distinctive of reasoning. For it will turn out that all processes describable by a 
rule—that is, all processes that display regularity in their behavior—are rule-
following processes. In which case, it will be no more true of reasoning that 
it involves rule-following than it will be of, say, the planets that they ‘follow’ 
a rule when conforming to Kepler’s laws of planetary motion ( Fodor, 1975 ). 
 Again, we think that the Intentional View provides a credible approach 
to this problem. According to this approach, 
 what distinguishes what organisms do from what the planets do is that 
a  representation of the rules they follow constitutes one of the causal 
determinants of their behavior. 
 ( Fodor, 1975 , 74) 
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 In contrast, where the planets are concerned, 
 at no point in a causal account of their turnings does one advert to a 
structure which encodes Kepler’s laws and causes them to turn. The 
planets  might have worked that way, but the astronomers assure us that 
they do not. 
 (ibid.) 
 In summary, if the Intentional View is correct, we have a prima facie plausible 
way both to resolve the Guidance Problem and to draw the rule-following/
rule-accordance distinction. Moreover, since a solution to these problems is 
a prerequisite for the Rule-Following View to have any explanatory value, 
it is exceedingly attractive to combine the Intentional and Rule-Following 
views in the manner proposed by IRFs. 
 Of course, the aforementioned is defeasible, and matters would be quite 
different if there were powerful independent reasons to reject IRFs. With 
this in mind, we turn to the Regress. 
 2. The Regress 
 Although a number of theorists have invoked variants of the Regress, 
Boghossian’s discussion strikes us as the most perspicuous, to date, and 
for this reason, we focus primarily on it here. In Section 2.1, we lay out 
Boghossian’s general strategy. In Section 2.2, we explain how he aims 
to establish a crucial premise of the argument, what we call the Rule 
Application Condition. Then in Section 2.3, we sketch the Regress itself, 
and in Section 2.4, we provide a more regimented formulation of the 
argument. 
 2.1 The General Strategy 
 It is important to distinguish the Regress, advocated by Boghossian and 
others, from a range of superficially similar worries. The relevant regress 
is  not an epistemic one. It is not, for example, a regress with respect to 
justification, or reasons for belief. Nor is it a regress concerning the deter-
mination of meanings or contents of the sort associated with Kripke’s 
Wittgenstein ( Kripke, 1982 ). Finally, it is not a definitional regress wherein 
the definiendum—‘inference’—is to be defined in terms of ‘rule-following’, 
which in turn is to be defined in terms of ‘inference’, and so on. Rather, the 
problem allegedly posed by the Regress is a regress of mental  operations . 
The worry, in brief, is that IRFs place active reasoning beyond the grasp of 
finite creatures by turning every instance of inference into a  supertask : an 
infinite sequence of rule-following operations to be performed in a finite 
period of time. 
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36 Paul D. Robinson and Richard Samuels
 Here is the general strategy: to generate the desired regress, Boghossian 
seeks to show that the IRF entails the following interlocking pair of conditions: 
 Condition 1 : Each inference I i requires a rule-following operation R j . 
 Condition 2 : Each rule-following operation R j requires some further 
inference I j . 
 Given these conditions, we can generate a regress of mental operations by 
cycling between them: 
 Suppose I draw inference I 1 ; 
 by  Condition 1 : I perform a rule-following operation R 1 ; 
 by  Condition 2 : I draw an inference I 2 . 
 by  Condition 1 : I perform a rule-following operation R 2 ; 
 by  Condition 2 : I draw an inference I 3 . 
 And so on . . . 
 A regress of mental operations ensues. In which case, if the conjunction of 
the Rule-Following View and Intentional View entail these conditions, then 
IRFs turn all inferences into supertasks. 
 2.2. Establishing Condition 2 
 How does Boghossian seek to establish that IRFs are committed to Conditions 
1 and 2? Since the Rule-Following View  asserts that all inference involves 
rule-following operations, Condition 1 is easily secured. Condition 1 is 
just a rendering of the Rule-Following View. In contrast, neither the Rule-
Following View nor the Intentional View asserts Condition 2. Boghossian’s 
main argumentative burden, then, is to show that they entail it. 
 How is this to be done? Rather than focusing on rules of inference, 
Boghossian initially discusses a simple  decision rule with the aim of drawing 
out some general morals regarding what, on the Intentional View, would be 
required for active, person-level rule-following: 
 Suppose I receive an email and that I answer it immediately. When 
would we say that this behavior was a case of following: 
 (Email Rule) Answer any email that calls for an answer immedi-
ately upon receipt! 
 as opposed to just being something that I happened to do that was in 
conformity with that rule? 
 Clearly, the answer is that it would be correct to say that I was follow-
ing the Email Rule in replying to the email, rather than just conforming 
to it, when it is because of the Email Rule that I reply immediately. 
 ( 2014 , 13) 
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Reasoning, Rules, and Representation 37
 Of course, this immediately raises an instance of the Guidance Problem: 
what is it to follow this rule, as opposed to merely  conforming to it? Since 
the E-mail Rule ‘qua rule, is just an abstract object’ it cannot  directly guide 
behavior. Instead, if the Intentional View is correct, 
 my behavior is to be explained via some state of mine that represents or 
encodes that rule. 
 (Ibid.) 
 Merely positing such an intentional state does not, however, fully explain 
this particular instance of rule-following activity. There also needs to be 
a process in which this rule-representation might figure so as to guide my 
behavior. And, according to Boghossian, it is plausible that this process con-
forms to the following pattern: 
 I have grasped the rule, and so am aware of its requirements. It calls on 
me to answer any email that I receive immediately. I am aware of hav-
ing received an email and so recognize that the antecedent of the rule 
has been satisfied. I know that the rule requires me to answer any email 
immediately and so conclude that I shall answer this one immediately. 
 (Ibid.) 
 Of course, this is only one specific instance of rule-following activity. 
Nevertheless, Boghossian takes it to illustrate what, on the Intentional View, 
active rule-following  in general would require: 
 On this Intentional construal of rule-following, then, my actively apply-
ing a rule can only be understood as a matter of my grasping what the 
rule requires, forming a view to the effect that its trigger conditions are 
satisfied, and drawing the conclusion that I must now perform the act 
required by its consequent. 
 (Ibid.) 
 Notice—and this is the crucial point—that this appears tantamount to 
claiming that “on the Intentional view of rule-following, rule-following 
requires inference” (ibid.). More precisely, Boghossian appears to be insist-
ing that, on the Intentional View, 
 Rule Application Condition: For a person-level rule-following process 
to utilize a rule-representation, it must contain an inferential sub-
process—an inference from the rule to what the rule calls for under 
the circumstances. 
 And, of course, if this is true, then so too is Condition 2. That is, the Rule 
Application Condition entails that each rule-following operation R j requires 
some further inference I j . 
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38 Paul D. Robinson and Richard Samuels
 2.3. The Regress Within Reach 
 If the aforementioned is correct, then an  intentional rule-following account 
of inference is committed to both Conditions 1 and 2. As Boghossian puts it, 
 On the one hand, we have the Intentional View of rule-following, 
according to which applying a rule always involves inference. On the 
other hand, we have the Rule-Following picture of inference according 
to which inference is always a form of rule-following. 
 ( 2014 , 14) 
 Further, if this is so, then it would seem that any instance of person-level 
rule-following must involve an infinite series of further rule-following opera-
tions. If, for example, I actively follow the E-mail Rule, then I must draw an 
inference in order to follow it, and since, by assumption, this involves rule-
following, I must draw another inference, which requires another instance 
of rule-following, and so on  ad infinitum . Thus Boghossian concludes, 
 These two views . . . can’t be true together. Combining the two views 
would lead us to conclude that following any rule requires embarking 
upon a vicious infinite regress in which we succeed in following no rule. 
 ( 2014 , 14) 
 Boghossian is not alone in drawing this pessimistic conclusion. For instance, 
for the same reason, Wright claims that if rule-following requires a state that 
carries a content that licenses the inferential transition, then it is “uncertain 
that any coherent—regress-free—model can be given of what inferring actu-
ally is” and hence, 
 we must drop the idea that inference is, everywhere and essentially, a 
kind of rule-following. That, in outline, is the solution to the problem 
of the Regress. 
 ( 2014 , 32f.) 
 Similarly, Broome claims that if rule-following requires an explicit represen-
tation of a rule, then 
 you would have to determine whether each particular case of potential 
reasoning falls under the rule. Doing so would require reasoning, which 
would again require following a rule. There would be a circle. 
 ( 2014 , 632) 
 In short, some very influential philosophers maintain that the Regress 
undermines IRF. 
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Reasoning, Rules, and Representation 39
 2.4. The Regress Regimented 
 With the earlier exegetical work complete, we are now in a position to set 
out the Regress in full dress. Our aim is to capture the details and spirit of 
Boghossian’s discussion as charitably as possible, though without logical 
lacunae. What follows is our best effort. 
 The Regress proceeds from the assumption that IRF is true, to the unten-
able conclusion that active reasoning—or inference—is impossible for finite 
creatures. And since the Regress targets IRFs about  active reasoning, it is 
natural to formulate the Rule-Following View and Intentional View in per-
son-level terms. That is, 
 (1) Any process of inference is a kind of person-level rule-following. 
 (2) Any process of person-level rule-following utilizes a person-level 
rule-representation. 
 Here (1) and (2) clearly characterize a version of IRF about inference, or 
active reasoning. But as we saw earlier, without additional premises, they do 
not suffice to generate a regress. Rather, one must further maintain a version 
of what we earlier called the Rule Application Condition: 
 (3) For a person-level, rule-following process to utilize a personal-level rule-
representation, it must contain an inferential sub-process—a person-level 
inference from the rule to what the rule calls for under the circumstances. 
 Here ‘sub-process’ is to be understood as referring to a  proper part of the 
person-level, rule-following process. 5 It follows from (1), (2), and (3) that 
 (4) Any inferential process involves an inferential sub-process. 
 Since any such inferential sub-process is itself an inference, it will also 
involve an inferential sub-process, and so on,  ad infinitum . Hence by itera-
tion on (4) we have 
 (5) Any inference requires infi nitely many inferential sub-processes. 
 But given that the performance of infinitely many inferences cannot be car-
ried out in finite time, it follows from (5) that 
 (6) Inference is impossible for fi nite beings like us. 
5 This is required to block an interpretation of (3) on which the rule-following process is iden-
tifi ed with the inference from the rule to what the rule calls for. For if such an identifi cation 
is made, (3) will not generate a regress of operations.
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40 Paul D. Robinson and Richard Samuels
6 Presumably, some eliminativists, behaviorists, and the like would deny this.
 Yet active reasoning  is possible for creatures such as us. At any rate, this 
is what Boghossian, Broome, Wright, and almost  everyone —including the 
present authors—suppose. 6 In which case, on the assumption that the IRF is 
true, we appear to have reason to reject the IRF. 
 3.  Sub-personal Processes, Revenge, and 
the Strengthened Regress 
 3.1 Getting Sub-personal 
 How should proponents of IRFs respond to the Regress? If premises (1)–(3) 
are true, then regress ensues. But it is plausible to reject premise (2) in favor of 
a weaker requirement. Specifically, proponents of IRFs may allow that person-
level rule-following  sometimes involves person-level rule-representations, while 
insisting that  sub-personal rule-representations may also play the requisite role. 
The resulting variant of the Rule-Following View can be formulated as follows: 
 (2**)  Any process of person-level rule-following utilizes a rule-represen-
tation that is either personal or sub-personal. 
 This modification evades the Regress. Moreover, it does so in an indepen-
dently motivated and independently plausible fashion. Although the per-
sonal/sub-personal distinction is a notoriously vexed one (see  Drayson, 
2012 ), for present purposes, the crucial requirement is—as Boghossian 
recognizes—that person-level processes are “processes of which we are, 
in some appropriate sense, aware” ( 2008 , 483). In contrast, sub-personal 
states are “not consciously accessible to the thinker” ( 2014 , 15). Yet if this is 
how we are to draw the personal/sub-personal distinction, it should be clear 
that any plausible IRF will need to insist that person-level rule-following 
quite typically involves  sub-personal rule-representations. This is because, as 
Boghossian, Broome, and many others recognize, active reasoners very typi-
cally  lack conscious awareness of following a rule. In which case, proponents 
of IRFs have exceedingly good reason to insist that rule-representing states 
are often sub-personal. Moreover, this has nothing to do with regress worries 
per se. Rather, it is mandated by the antecedent assumption that active rea-
soning is a commonplace cognitive activity, along with the overwhelmingly 
plausible empirical claim that active reasoners very frequently lack conscious 
awareness of any relevant rule or rule-representing state. More generally, the 
point is that once a theory posits representational states to explain a cogni-
tive phenomenon, the hypothesized states must be sub-personal if the agent 
lacks conscious awareness of them. In this regard, proponents of IRFs are 
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in the same predicament as psycholinguistics who posit sub-personal rep-
resentations of syntactic rules, or vision scientists who posit sub-personal 
representations of edges. And, in our view, this is not bad company to keep. 
 3.2. The Revenge Regress 
 We have argued that weakening (2) in the proposed manner both evades the 
earlier regress and is independently plausible. Nonetheless, the proponent 
of IRF is not out of the woods yet. For, as critics note, a closely analogous 
sub-personal regress can be generated. Thus Boghossian maintains, 
 In the present context, going sub-personal presumably means identifying 
rule- acceptance . . . not with some person-level state, such as an inten-
tion, but with some sub-personal state . . . Let us say that [such a state] 
is some sub-personal intentional [i.e., representational] state in which the 
rule’s requirements are explicitly encoded. Then, once again, it would 
appear that some inference (now sub-personal) will be required to figure 
out what the rule calls for under the circumstances. And at this point the 
regress will recur. 
 ( 2008 , 498) 
 The core insight of the earlier passage is that merely extending the 
Intentional View to cover sub-personal rule-following does little to alter the 
overall structure of the IRF. In which case, one might think that if utilizing 
a person-level rule-representation requires an inferential sub-process, then 
utilizing a sub-personal rule-representation will also require an inferential 
sub-process—albeit a  sub-personal one. And if this is so, then we can gener-
ate a  Revenge Regress that mirrors the original: 
 (1*) Any sub-personal inference is a kind of sub-personal rule-following. 
 (2*) Any process of sub-personal rule-following utilizes a sub-personal 
rule-representation. 
 (3*) For a sub-personal rule-following process to utilize a rule-representa-
tion, it must contain an inferential sub-process—a  sub-personal infer-
ence from the rule to what the rule calls for under the circumstances. 
 From (1*– 3*) it follows that 
 (4*) Any sub-personal inference involves a sub-personal inferential 
sub-process. 
 And since any such inferential sub-process is itself a sub-personal inference, 
by iteration on (4*) we may infer the following: 
 (5*) Any sub-personal inference requires infi nitely many sub-personal 
inferential sub-processes. 
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42 Paul D. Robinson and Richard Samuels
 Finally, given that the performance of infinitely many sub-personal infer-
ences cannot be carried out in finite time, it follows from (5*) that 
 (6*) Sub-personal inference is impossible for fi nite sub-personal systems 
like ours. 
 3.3 Regress Strengthened 
 No doubt, this conclusion will be welcome to those already suspicious of 
intentional explanations of the sort found in cognitive science. For the pro-
ponent of IRF, however, the Revenge Regress is exceedingly unfortunate. 
Supposedly, by allowing for sub-personal rule-representation, IRFs have 
an independently plausible way to escape the original Regress. But if the 
Revenge Regress is sound, the escape route is blocked, and the IRF is left 
without a way to account for active reasoning. 
 In our experience, the significance of the Revenge Regress is not always 
clearly appreciated. One problem is that it targets a different phenomenon 
from the earlier Regress—i.e.,  sub-personal inference. Why, then, should it 
be relevant to theories of  person-level inference? Another problem is that 
proponents of the Regress never spell out in detail how the Revenge Regress 
interacts with the original one in order to strengthen the case against IRFs 
further. In view of this, it would be helpful to fill the gap by showing how 
to combine the Revenge Regress with the original argument in order to 
develop a  Strengthened Regress . Again, here is our best effort. 
 First, assume the Rule-Following View: 
 (1) Any process of inference is a kind of person-level rule-following. 
 Next, in view of the response to the original Regress, reject (2) and replace 
it with 
 (2**)  Any process of person-level rule-following utilizes a rule-representa-
tion that is either personal or sub-personal. 
 Now we require two variants of the Rule Application Condition. The first 
we retain from the original argument: 
 (3) For a person-level, rule-following process to utilize a personal-level rule-
representation, it must contain an inferential sub-process—a person-level 
inference from the rule to what the rule calls for under the circumstances. 
 However, the replacement of (2) by (2**) requires that we supplement it 
with another variant of the Rule Application Condition: 
 (3**)  For a personal-level, rule-following process to utilize a  sub-personal 
rule-representation, it must contain an inferential sub-process—a 
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Reasoning, Rules, and Representation 43
 sub-personal inference from the rule to what the rule calls for under 
the circumstances. 
 The crucial difference between (3) and (3**) is, of course, that the former 
specifies what is involved in using person-level rule-representations, whereas 
the latter specifies what is involved when actively reasoning with sub-personal 
rules. These premises commit the intentionalist not to (4) but to 
 (4**)  Any person-level inference involves either a person-level or sub-per-
sonal inferential sub-process. 
 Moreover, the Revenge Regress still commits the intentionalist to 
 (4*)  Any sub-personal inference involves a sub-personal inferential sub-process. 
 Suppose we try to carry out a process of active reasoning. By (4**), it 
involves a sub-process of either active reasoning or sub-personal inference. 
If it involves the former, then (4**) will also apply to that sub-process. Thus 
if successive iterations were always to lead to a further sub-process of active 
reasoning, then they would generate the original regress. But if at any stage 
active reasoning involves a sub-personal inference, then by iteration on (4*), 
the Revenge Regress is generated. So we have shown not (5) but rather 
 (5**)  Any inference requires infi nitely many person-level or sub-personal 
inferential sub-processes. 
 Hence for the by now familiar reason, 
 (6) Inference is impossible for fi nite beings like us. 
 QED. 
 4. Rejecting the Strengthened Regress 
 Although the Regress is widely supposed to show that IRFs are untenable, 
we maintain that such a view is unwarranted. Even in its strengthened form, 
the Regress is unsound. 
 Our first pass response to the Strengthened Regress is to reject (4*)—the 
claim that any sub-personal inference involves additional inferential sub-
processes. We take it to be obvious that any remotely plausible theory of 
sub-personal inference—intentionalist, or otherwise—must reject this com-
mitment, since it is viciously regressive all by itself. But, of course, (4*) is 
a consequence of premises (1*)–(3*) of the Revenge Regress. So if we are 
to reject (4*), it must be because one of those premises is false. Further, 
since our response to the original Regress was to advocate an IRF for sub-
personal inference, we are committed to rejecting (3*) since (1*) and (2*) 
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7 Or, at any rate, a caricature of refl exes.
simply describe the Rule-Following and Intentional Views as they apply to 
sub-personal inference. Our challenge, then, is to argue that it is legitimate 
to reject (3*). 
 How is this to be done? Premise (3*) is a sub-personal version of the Rule 
Application Condition. It maintains that sub-personal rule-following of the 
kind envisaged by the Intentional View requires an inferential sub-process 
from the rule to what the rule calls for under the circumstances. The obvious 
way to justify the rejection of (3*), then, is to explain how a sub-personal 
process might utilize a rule-representation without thereby containing an 
inferential sub-process. We think that this challenge can be met and indeed 
that the right response is an exceedingly familiar one. 
 4.1. The ‘Primitivist’ Strategy 
 Causal-explanatory regress is among the most commonplace theoretical 
challenges to intentional theories in cognitive science. It should come as no 
surprise, then, that cognitive scientists have a routine strategy for quashing 
such worries. In our view, this strategy works extremely generally, including 
for IRFs about sub-personal inference. 
 Obviously, the intentionalist about rule-following processes cannot 
maintain—on pain of regress—that rule-guided psychological processes 
 always involve further rule-guided psychological processes. Yet the inten-
tionalist need not make this commitment. Instead, they can—and often 
do—posit a level of  primitive processing mechanisms. Such processors may 
take rule-representations as inputs. In which case, the primitive processes 
they subserve will, in a sense, be rule-guided—though only in the thin sense 
that a rule-representation is causally implicated in the process because it is 
an  input to the processor. In contrast to non-primitive processes, however, 
primitive ones are  not rule-guided in a richer sense. That is, they are not 
rule-guided in the sense that they involve  further rule-guided or inferential 
sub-processes. Thus, if non-primitive processes—such as those involved 
in active reasoning—ultimately decompose into primitive ones, then we 
have a general view of psychological processes on which rule application 
regresses cannot occur. 
 4.2. Primitive Processes and Reflexes 
 The earlier primitivist proposal is, of course, exceedingly well-known 
( Block, 1995 ;  Dennett, 1978 ;  Fodor, 1968 ,  1987 ;  Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988 ; 
 Pylyshyn, 1980 ). But to see how it helps address the Regress, it is useful to 
clarify the notion of primitive processes. We think that this is usefully done 
by comparing them with prototypical (monosynaptic) reflexes. 7 Primitive 
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processes are closely analogous to prototypical reflexes in two crucial 
respects and, importantly, disanalogous in another. A first point of similarity 
is their  automaticity . Given the relevant input conditions, a reflex generates 
a fixed behavioral output. Knock a knee, and it flexes. Analogously, provide 
input to a primitive processor, and it too flexes automatically—though not 
to lift a knee, but to output a representation. 
 A second similarity is that, in contrast to non-primitive intentional pro-
cesses, the input-output relations of both reflexes and primitive processes 
are not inferentially mediated. Given a blow to the knee, it flexes, and as 
far as we know, no intervening stage of the process involves an inference or 
rule-following operation. The same holds for primitive psychological pro-
cesses. They too have no intermediate stages that involve further inference 
or rule-following. 
 Yet there is, of course, an important difference between prototypical 
monosynaptic reflexes, and primitive psychological processes. In the case 
of reflexes, such as the patellar or corneal reflexes, the input is not a repre-
sentation. Crudely put, it is a mere physical magnitude—a stimuli. In con-
trast, for primitive processes to play their assigned role within an intentional 
psychology, it is necessary that their inputs are representational. Indeed, in 
the cases of interest here, it is necessary that they represent  rules . Primitive 
processors of the relevant sort, then, must be automatic, non-inferentially 
mediated, rule-applicators. By virtue of being rule-applicators, they can 
underwrite an intentional account of sub-personal inference, and by virtue 
of being automatic and non-inferentially mediated, they evade the concern 
that the application of any rule requires a further inferential step. They thus 
provide an alternative model of sub-personal rule application, which per-
mits the proponent of IRF to reject (3*). 
 4.3. Primitive Processes and Stored Program Computers 
 The aforementioned might well sound rather mysterious were we to lack 
any model of how sub-personal inference could “bottom out” in processes 
that are reflex-like and yet rule-guided in the thin sense outlined earlier. 
But we  do possess a model of such processes. For what we are describing is 
closely akin to a core aspect of standard, stored program computers. Such 
computers take programs (rules) as input, and many of their sub-processes 
involve rule-governed sub-processes (inferences). But computers are orga-
nized in such a manner that sooner or later all this rule-governed activity 
decomposes in a set of reflex-like operations, which do not rely on any 
further inferential activity. Indeed, their possession of this characteristic is 
among the central reasons that the concept of a stored program computer 
became so important to cognitive science. For it provides a model of how 
a system can be rule-guided without thereby succumbing to regress prob-
lems ( Dennett, 1982 ;  Fodor, 1975 ,  2000 ). The notion of a primitive pro-
cess is simply a generalization of this aspect of stored program computers, 
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formulated in a manner that remains neutral regarding the precise nature of 
the processors and operations involved in human cognition. 
 4.4. Primitive Processes and Cognitive Architecture 
 It is worth stressing that the aforementioned is little more than standard 
background theory in much of cognitive science. This is because a hypoth-
esized set of primitive processes and operations is a core facet of what, by 
deliberate analogy with computer science, is ordinarily called  cognitive 
architecture . 
 As Zenon Pylyshyn noted a very long time ago, a cognitive architecture 
consists, at least in part, of “those functions or basic operations of men-
tal processing that are themselves not given a process explanation” ( 1980 , 
126). That is, they are psychological functions and operations that are not 
to be explained in terms of other  psychological processes—specifically, pro-
cesses that deploy rules and representations (ibid.). In this respect, Pylyshyn 
continues, they are quite unlike “cognitive functions in general . . . [which] 
are . . . explainable . . . in terms of rules and representations” (ibid.). Instead, 
primitive processes and operations are “appealed to in characterizing cogni-
tion” and “are themselves explainable biologically rather than in terms of 
rules and representations” (ibid.) 
 By broad consent, it is an empirical matter  which specific cognitive 
processes and operations are primitive. That there  are such processes and 
operations is, however, widely—and we think correctly—assumed to be 
a presupposition of any sensible intentional psychological science and for 
the very same reason that primitive operations are a prerequisite for any 
sensible version of IRF. Without such operations, regress ensues. Again, as 
Pylyshyn observed long ago, the positing of primitive processes and opera-
tions avoids “a regress of levels of interpreters, with each one interpreting 
the rules of the higher level and each in turn following its own rules of 
interpretation” (ibid.). 
 5. Counterarguments 
 Positing primitive sub-personal processes allows proponents of IRFs to 
reject the Rule Application Condition—(3*)—and thereby neutralize the 
Regress, even in its strengthened form. Yet, as already noted, this regress-
blocking strategy is an exceedingly familiar one from cognitive science. So 
it is somewhat surprising that it receives so little attention in the literature 
on active reasoning. 
 Why might this be? One obvious possibility is that the cost of primitivism 
is in some way too high—that it staves off the Regress, only to raise other 
no less serious problems for IRFs. In this section, we conclude by briefly 
considering two possible problems of this sort, which are hinted at in the 
literature on active reasoning. 
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 5.1.  Positing Primitive Processes Addresses the Strengthened 
Regress Only at the Expense of Succumbing to Well-Known 
Kripkensteinian Rule-Following Problems 
 Primitive rule-applicators take rule-representations as inputs. But one might 
find it deeply puzzling how such inputs could have rules as their  contents . 
How, for example, might an input determinately represent modus ponens 
as opposed to some other rule? The obvious suggestion is that it represents 
the rule in virtue of the effects it has on the processor itself—that it induces 
modus ponens–like behavior in the processor. Yet this suggestion appears to 
raise Kripke’s familiar Wittgensteinian worries about rule-following. Out of 
the frying pan and into the fire. 
 We are tempted to give the earlier worry short shrift. The Regress, as 
understood by its advocates (and by us), is entirely independent of Kripke’s 
problem. Our aim here has been to address the Regress. If Kripke’s problem 
remains unaddressed, so be it. That’s a problem for another day. 
 Of course, if primitivism generated special Kripkensteinian worries for 
IRFs, then this quick-fire response would ring hollow. But we deny that it 
has such consequences. First, Kripke’s problem is orthogonal to the issue of 
whether one adopts the primitivist proposal. If Kripke’s problem is a serious 
one for IRF, then it applies equally to primitive processes  and non-primitive 
ones. Kripke’s problem concerns the possibility of internalizing a determi-
nate rule, given that it is supposed to cover a potential infinity of cases. 
Assuming the Intentional View of rule-following, this reduces to the issue of 
what it is for an intentional state to determinately  represent a specific, infini-
tary rule. Further, if IRF is correct, then both primitive and non-primitive 
processes rely on rule-representations of very much the same sort. In which 
case, it is hard to see why Kripkean concerns would not arise equally for 
both sorts of processes. In short, positing primitive processes should make 
no difference to whether or not Kripke’s problem undermines IRF. 
 Second, we deny that Kripke’s problem is especially troublesome for IRFs 
as such, whether or not they endorse primitivism. To be clear, IRFs are 
theories about a class of psychological processes—i.e., inferential ones. In 
contrast, as Boghossian notes, 
 Kripke’s problem arises against the backdrop of a naturalistic outlook 
relative to which it is difficult to see how there could be determinate 
facts about which infinitary rule I have internalized. 
 ( 2014 , 13) 
 For proponents of IRF, to “internalize” a rule is to represent it. In which case, 
Kripke’s problem clearly arises for IRFs only when one further demands a 
 naturalistic account of rule-representation. In contrast, the problem has 
no traction if one “waives naturalistic constraints”—e.g., by allowing for 
primitive facts regarding the content of rule-representing states. 
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48 Paul D. Robinson and Richard Samuels
 Speaking personally, we are not much inclined toward this sort of non-
naturalism. But that’s beside the point. Our point is that Kripke’s problem 
is not a problem for primitivism as such, or even IRFs as such. Indeed, it 
is not a problem about psychological processes at all. Rather, it is a prob-
lem for naturalistic theories of  content . Moreover, it is one that arises 
for them entirely independently of issues to do with rule- following . If 
one accepts that we can so much as  think about determinate, infinitary 
rules—e.g., modus ponens—then the problem arises for naturalistic theo-
ries of content. 
 5.2.  Although Positing Primitive Processes May Save an IRF for 
Sub-personal Inference, It Does So Only at the Expense of 
Rendering IRF Untenable for Active Reasoning 
 At one stage, Boghossian considers a proposal about sub-personal inference, 
which may appear to resemble primitivism to a considerable degree. It goes 
like this: 
 I consider [the premises] (1) and (2). I do so with the aim of figuring 
out what follows from these propositions, what proposition they sup-
port. A sub-personal mechanism within me “recognizes” the premises 
to have a certain logical form. This activates some sub-personal state 
that encodes the MP rule which then puts into place various automatic, 
sub-personal processes that issue in my believing [the conclusion] (3). 
 ( 2014 , 15) 
 Setting aside the challenge posed by the Revenge Regress, which he main-
tains is “importantly correct”, Boghossian is prepared to imagine that some 
reasoning works like this. However, he continues, 
 That is not the sort of reasoning that this paper is about—rather, it is 
about person-level reasoning, reasoning as a mental action that a per-
son performs, in which he is either aware, or can become aware, of why 
he is moving from some beliefs to others. 
 No such process of reasoning can be captured by a picture in which 
(a) reasoning is a matter of following rules with respect to the contents 
of our attitudes and (b) our following rules with respect to the contents 
of our attitudes is a matter of automatic, subconscious, sub-personal 
processes moving us from certain premises to certain conclusions. 
 If this is so, then it may seem that, by introducing such sub-personal processes, 
we fail to account for the sort of active reasoning we sought to understand 
in the first place. And since this sort of sub-personal process looks much like 
primitive rule application, it may further appear that endorsing primitivism 
thereby undermines the prospect of an IRF about active reasoning. 
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 Appearances, at least in this instance, are misleading. As we noted in 
Section 3, it is widely if not universally supposed that active reasoners often, 
though not invariably, lack conscious awareness of the rules they are fol-
lowing (cf.  Boghossian, 2014 , 12). 8 In which case, it ought to be common 
ground that there are two different kinds of active reasoning: 
 AR 1 : Active reasoning for which there is conscious awareness of the 
premises and the conclusion, but not the rule. 
 AR 2 : Active reasoning for which there is conscious awareness of the 
premises, the conclusion,  and the rule. 
 If the representation of the rule is sub-personal, we have AR 1 . If the rep-
resentation of the rule is person-level, we have AR 2 —the sort of reasoning 
that Boghossian says he seeks to explain. 
 In our view, a theory of reasoning ought to capture  both these kinds of 
active reasoning. And, as far as we can tell, our response to the Regress in 
no way prevents us from doing so. If we insisted that  all rule application 
was sub-personal, then we could not. But we make no such commitment. 
Indeed, we allow for at least four different sorts of rule-governed process. 
 • We allow for AR 2 because we accept that, in some cases, people are con-
scious of the rules they follow as well as their premise and conclusion 
attitudes. 
 • We allow for AR 1 because we posit rule-representations that are sub-
personal and, hence, not the subject of conscious awareness. 
 • We allow for non-primitive, sub-personal inferences where one has no 
conscious awareness of premises, conclusion, or rule. 
 • Finally, we allow for primitive sub-personal rule application processes, 
which involve no inferential sub-processes but are rule-governed, in a 
thin sense, by virtue of taking rule-representations as input. 
 The main point of positing this hierarchy of processes was to allow for 
dependencies that block the Regress in a plausible fashion. Thus, for exam-
ple, in some cases, AR 2 may rely on AR 1 so that a consciously accessible rule 
is applied via an inferential sub-process whose rule is not, itself, consciously 
accessible. Further, we allow that such AR 1 processes may rely on non-
primitive, sub-personal inferences. And, of course, we  insist that all such 
cascades must at some point rely on primitive rule application processes. 
Far from failing to accommodate AR 2 , we maintain that we accommodate 
it, and many other sorts of inference beside. 
8 Furthermore, that children can engage in active reasoning is taken to be an important reason 
to avoid conceptual oversophistication in their accounts (see, e.g., Broome, 2013, 229, 236; 
Boghossian, 2014, 6).
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 6. Conclusion 
 We started by touting the prima facie explanatory virtues of IRFs. We then 
argued that, by positing a cascade of different sorts of rule application pro-
cesses, IRFs can accommodate active reasoning in a non-regressive fashion. 
Specifically, we argued that these resources allow proponents of IRFs to 
address the Regress, even in its strengthened form. We concluded by sug-
gesting that our solution does not generate any obviously untenable con-
sequences for IRFs. In view of this, and contrary to the opinion of many, 
we conclude that the Regress fails to undermine intentional rule-following 
accounts of reasoning. 
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